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INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper has been because of my involvement in research that 
considers the mineral industry’s involvement in community engagement.  Of 
course, this immediately involves the question of what community is, because 
the form of engagement undertaken by companies will depend not only on 
the company’s understanding of community, but also, given companies’ 
responsiveness to stakeholders, on the “ community’s”  perception of itself. I 
don’t use any of the empirical data that we are collecting from the eight 
mining sites in the three-year project. However, the question certainly began 
to form very strongly as I went about the process of interviewing people.  To 
be honest, I began to form a rather cynical hypothesis that community might 
be considered mostly as nothing more than coalitions of disaffection. For 
someone, who always considered himself to be a collectivist and 
communitarian, opposed strongly to the neo-liberal hegemony in 
contemporary society this came as something of a shock. 
 
The paper is in three parts. The first part looks generally from a 
philosophical perspective at the theory of community. The second part looks 
at more specific conceptualisations of community. The third part then 
considers the likely political (ie, corporate and government) expressions of 
those community types. 
 
1. PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE  
 
Broadly, I reduce the philosophical foundation of community into three 
broad areas: liberal, communitarian, and postmodern. A lready there are 
difficulties: e.g., where would one place the Marxist-turned-Thomist 
philosopher, A lisdair MacIntyre, or the liberal John Dewey, both of whom I 
incorporate in the communitarian camp. As well, I have not identified the 
conservative position. In summary, it could be said that the conservative 
position as expressed by Burke and Hegel, is less enthusiastic about rights 
than about tradition and authority mediated through the institutions of 
family, nation, school, and church. For them, so long as these institutions are 
upheld, people can express their individuality. Thus, the conservative 
generally upholds economic individualism and institutional collectivism. 
Nonetheless, I will use this division as I believe that it provides useful 
differences that produce different conceptions of the social object and subject, 
guiding moral principles, and justifications for (in)action. 
 
The liberal conception of community, in this paper, is best understood as 
a set of antithetical characteristics1: 
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Liberal Communitarian 
private public 
market economy state intervention 
individual Social 
enterprise constraint 
Within the contemporary neo-liberal hegemony, given its close association of 
the subject w ith homo economicus (Rose, 1992), it is inevitable that community 
is closely associated with economic outcomes individually. Naturalist agency, 
where people “ are agents of their own action, with behaviour made 
predictable by their unconstrained self-interest”   (Dixon, Dogan, & Sanderson, 
2005, p. 8), or the “ autonomous subject”  (Bell, 1993, p. 29) is the assumed 
subject position within liberal theory2. As a result the liberal concept of 
community is “ freedom from constraint”  (Champlin, 1997, p. 581). The more 
libertarian liberal espouses both a normative and methodological 
individualism. Normative individualism identifies individualism as the 
ontological purpose of life. This is most strongly put by Buchanan whose 
Public Choice theory assumes that the public interest ‘is what the individual 
says it is’ and also rejects any sense of collectivity (Marginson, 1992, p. 52). In 
this sense, Buchanan’s theory is quite distinct from the conservative position 
that identifies the collectivising elements of family, nation, school, and 
religion as the foundations of society. Methodological individualism identifies 
the constructing of social reality solely in terms of the individual, not in 
collective terms, such as ‘society’. Thatcher, for example, declared that there is 
no such thing as society (Jarvis, 1998, p. 44). This is most clearly seen in 
Positive and Classical Economics which founds its ‘science’ on the presumed 
behaviour of individuals. Neo-liberal economist, Milton Friedman, and Public 
Choice political theorist, James Buchanan, are both normative and 
methodological individualists. Friedman (1962) states that ‘freedom of the 
individual, or perhaps the family’ is identified as the primary goal of his 
philosophy in Capitalism and Freedom (p. 12).  
Communitarianism delineates itself on the crucial ontological issue of 
whether social life and personal identity are understood in the atomist terms 
of liberalism or ‘in terms of shared goods, of language and other factors that 
cannot be accounted for by nor reduced to individuals’, the “ irreducibly 
social”  understanding of communitarians (Abbey & Taylor, 1996, p. 3). 
Simons (1996) agrees, claiming that ‘the ontological issue for liberalism is the 
primacy of individual rights and freedom’, while for communitarians it ‘is 
primacy of community life and the good of collectivities’ (p. 33). 
Communitarianism obviously values community more highly than liberal, 
but is sensitive to the liberal claim of individual freedom. Communitarians 
are not prepared, as liberals are, to accept extensive economic and social 
disadvantage in a civil society. Pusey (1996) sees this as the essential 
contrasting feature of the two political and subjective idealisations: between 
the ‘communitarian self’ and ‘contractarian /  libertarian self’ (p. 71), an area 
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that has raised considerable discussion in the past decade  (e.g., Baier, 1995; 
Etzioni, 1995a; Oakeshott, 1993; Taylor, 1989, 1995), although admittedly more 
by philosophers and sociologists than by economists. These rival 
constructions of the self are based upon two types of self, in a philosophical 
sense. One is the ethically consequentialist self who is concerned with social 
outcomes as much as with personal outcomes (Pusey, 1996, p. 75). The other is 
the individualistic self whose ‘freedom to choose’ is the ultimate ground in 
contractarianism /  libertarianism.  
The postmodern conception of community essentially regards it as 
socially constructed and fragmentary: as a result, definitions are elusive, even 
contradictory (Popple, 1995, p. 3). Reacting against conceptualisations of 
community that are founded on “ fixed characteristics and spaces, objective 
structures, and universalized ideals such as mutuality, harmony and 
closeness (Burkett, 2001, p. 237) , the postmodern conception sees instead 
change, subjective constructions, and fragmentation. Bauman (1991) stresses 
that the postmodern condition means that we must adapt to “ living at peace 
with ambivalence”  (p. 15). Thus Burkett  asserts that community should be 
seen as a verb rather than a noun to acknowledge the ongoing process of 
being a community (p. 237) and to limit the fixity of place. Given this, it is not 
surprising then that certain postmodern theorists consider contemporary 
communities as “ counterfeit … [and] imitations of fantasies”  (Freie, 1998), a 
view supported by the empirical work of Bornat (1997) who concluded that 
“ Constructions of community life necessarily include stories which may have 
the status of art or fable”  (p. 31). For most postmodernists then, community is 
an illusion or a simulacrum of what once may have been but is no more. 
However, Brent (2004) takes a more hopeful view in saying that, although 
illusory, it at least remains an ideal of desired  practice worth striving for, and 
indicative of our social and political life (p. 216). 
 
2. SPECIFIC CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF COM M UNITY.  
 
These philosophical assumptions form the tacit bedrock of multiple 
conceptions of community. The following six characterisations of community 
represent the various ways in which community is understood. Such 
conceptions are either explicit or implicit in the way that community-oriented 
activity is practised. 
 
A: Community as Loss 
 
Community is often invoked when seeking to “ regain”  some lost 
desirable characteristic. Fremeaux (2005) refers to this as “ community as a 
deplorable loss of a certain social organization”  (p. 265), a feature of early 
twentieth century social thinking influenced by Tonnies’ concepts of 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Of course, this accompanied the transformation 
of society from rural to urban accompanying the economic industrialisation. 
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The idealised Gemeinschafte “ starts from an assumption of a unity of wills as 
an original or natural condition of found preeminently in the nature of the 
relationship between individuals who are related to one another ... [based on] 
the solidifying psychological and social ties that hold together families and 
groups”  (Christenson, 1984, p. 161). The alternative form, Gesellschaftliche 
relationships, “ are rationalistic in structure, instrumental in form, 
individualistic in motivation, and exploitive in consequence. ... [It is] a 
construct stimulated by modern industrial production and a money 
economy”  (p. 162). A lthough not proposing a dualistic conception of 
community, these extremes provide a useful means of characterising the lived 
experiences and the discourses of “ communities” . The ideal Gemeinschaft has 
been frequently represented by those involved in housing, transport, and 
urban renewal programs as damaged or threatened by “ rational”  economic 
and technological processes leading to social deprivation and system 
dysfunction (Hoggett, 1997). “ Lost”  communities are often radicalised 
through grassroots action by those who are disadvantaged, although such 
action may often led by other than those directly affected.  
 
Some direct the source of this loss directly to contemporary economic 
circumstances. Community is lost, these people believe, because of a 
“ perceived loss of civil society”  (Waddock, 1999, p. 334). This loss  results 
from corporatisation and globalisation which forces people to work longer 
hours and to pursue consumerist values, according to some (Barber, 1995; 
Derber, 1992; Greider, 1998). However, the impact of globalization on 
community tends to be played down by postmodernists such as Burkett who 
says that it “ does not mean the end of spatially defined communities and nor 
does it mean that what predominates is an ‘ideology of globalism’”  (Burkett, 
2001, p. 237). 
 
B. Community as Mutually Beneficial 
 
Community can be understood as a form of social organisation 
producing mutual benefit for its participants. Integral to most theorists who 
see community as mutually beneficial is the concept of social capital 3. The 
term, first popularised by Putnam (Putnam, 2000, 2001), recognises people’s 
capacity to draw on a range of economic and cultural resources through 
participation and social networks. In concrete terms, this means co-operation; 
involvement; social integration; participation of all ranks; community capacity 
to identify needs, define problems, and execute courses of action; as well as 
the capacity to acknowledge community resources and, where necessary, 
draw on outside resources (Campfens, 1996). If social capital is to be truly 
democratic and sustainable, then processes must empower marginalised 
people and communities by enhancing the “ essential tools”  to critically 
analyse their situation.  
 
Social capital means “ networks of social relations characterised by 
norms of trust and reciprocity” , and as a resource to action (Stone & Hughes, 
2000). Similarly, Falk and Harrison(2000) define social capital as “ the 
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networks, norms and trust which constitute the resources required for 
individuals, workplaces, groups, organisations and communities to strive for 
sustainable futures in a changing socio-economic environment” . Clearly 
implicit in the concept of social capital are values of trust and reciprocity 
maintaining a cohesive community. In fact, reciprocity is a vital element of the 
mutually beneficial community (Dixon et al., 2005, p. 5). Reciprocity is also a 
vital element of community-based deliberative democratic procedures. Social 
networks in communities are not sufficient to sustain the social relations 
necessary to maintain community, according to Friedland (2001), who sees 
trust and reciprocity as vital elements of solidarity’ (p. 366). Gutmann and 
Thompson in Democracy and Disagreement (1996) see reciprocity as vital to the 
practice of democratic politics in dealing with conflicts about fundamental 
values. This central notion of deliberative democracy, reciprocity, means to 
act fairly; display mutual respect toward opponents; and  demand mutually 
acceptable resolutions of disagreements using arguments that are "consistent 
with reliable methods of inquiry". 
  
C: Community as Values 
 
This traditional view “ represents community as a place of warmth, 
intimacy and social cohesion”  (Popple quoted in  Burkett, 2001, p. 236). 
Underlying this are humane principles of cooperation and selflessness. For 
example, Putnam’s concept of social capital is inherently positively value-
laden (Fremeaux, 2005, p. 269) given that social networks enhance “ the norms 
of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” . Sociologist, Amitai 
Etzioni (1995b), also sees social networks as crucial to the dissemination and 
maintenance of values. He portrays communities as  
“ social webs of people who know one another as persons and 
have a moral voice,”  members use these bonds to “ encourage 
members to abide by shared values … [and] gently chastise 
those who violate shared moral norms and express approbation 
for those who abide by them”  (quoted  in Fremeaux, 2005, p. 
269).  
However, such normativity is not always quite so explicit as “ community 
values”  are often implied (Waddock, 1999).  
 
D: Community as Democratic 
 
Community is understood as necessary for democracy. For example 
Friedland (2001) asserts that a strong version of democracy is deliberative and 
participatory (p. 359). This means that citizens must have the opportunity to 
deliberate in public “ to discuss and formulate issues and ideas that are 
important to them” ; deliberations must have the possibility of forming public 
agendas; and that citizens should have the opportunity to participate in and 
formulate their solutions (p. 359). Whether and how communities are 
communicatively integrated depends on “ communication ecologies”  (p. 360).  
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E: Community as Place & Identity 
 
The link between a sense of community and a sense of place [SOP] is not 
well established  (Clark & Stein, 2003), although community is associated with 
the social and environmental characteristics of place (Clark et al., 2003; Pretty, 
Chipuer, & Bramston, 2003, p. 275). The importance of the social is also 
asserted by Fried (2000) who states that “ community attachment appears 
rooted in the individual’s involvement in local social relations”  (p. 194). SOP 
indicators have been shown, in an Australian rural town study, to be 
significantly related to sense of community and behavioural commitment 
measure of place attachment (Pretty et al., 2003, p. 282). Community 
attachment, say Clark and Stein (2003) is one of three components of a sense 
of place, along with dependence and identity (p. 869). 
 
The level of community identity, says Puddifoot (2003) is characterised 
by factors such as contentedness, security, and involvement, as well as social 
factors such as perceived engagement of others in community life and the 
degree of neighbourliness. Clark and Stein (2003) found that residents identify 
with different aspects of their community, but were unable to support or 
refute length of residence with a resident’s orientation (p. 875). Puddifoot’s 
(2003) study of inhabitants in a well defined and historically significant 
English city, showed that there are six shared and personal dimensions to 
sense of community identity. They are sense of personal support from the 
community, sense of personal contentedness and security in the community, 
sense of active personal involvement in the community, perceived 
engagement of other community members in the community life, perceived 
neighbourliness and perception of settledness in the community. 
However, the study on a sense of place in rural Australian towns by 
Pretty, Chipuer and Bramston (2003) found that adults and adolescents have 
different perceptions of place and that the sense of community was 
significantly related to behavioural commitment to the place. Like Bonaiuto et 
al (1999), age of residents was also related to sense of community and place. 
 
Thus we can conclude that a sense of community is measurable. It 
comprises place dependence, identity, and attachment. When place is 
considered as community, it is clear that this place identity is shaped by 
community support, contentedness and security, a feeling of active personal 
involvement in the community by oneself and others, perceived 
neighbourliness and settledness. 
 
F: Community as Divisive 
 
In contrast to these positive representations of community, some 
theorists assert that communities produce negative effects. Far from being 
cohesive and mutually supportive, communities thrive on enmity, are 
divisive and disunited, according to Brent (2004). While acknowledging that 
“ community activities are messy and conflictual” , Brent argues that they can 
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make useful offensive claims on the wider world (p. 216). Communities 
whether considered as assemblages built around place or activity will 
inevitably involve unequal relationships. Thus, structural features of age, 
sex(uality), ethnicity, religion, and geography which are correlated with 
inequality in various ways, will inevitably produce frictions, exclusions, and 
conflict.   
 
Another heterogeneic view of community, however, suggests more 
positive outcomes. While homogeneity is implicit in traditional conceptions of 
community, the paradox—the strength of weak ties— asserted by Granovetter 
(Granovetter, 1973) is that “ individuals operate better in a complex society if 
they have access to networks that incorporate people with different 
backgrounds and experiences from oneself and which require limited 
commitment to the group”  (Flora, 1998, p. 491). 
 
 
3. DEFINING COM M UNITY  
 
Community, then, remains an elusive phenomenon to define. 
Nonetheless, an attempt must be made. Brent (2004), acknowledging its 
“ powerful insubstantiality” , provides three elements: trace, “ impossible 
presence”  and supplement (p. 220). Trace, a Derridean concept, is a “ past that 
has never been present” , thereby allowing a meaning. Thus, unable to achieve 
a presence, it needs to supplement, thereby allowing the continual possibility 
of being something that is understood. Lacking tangible substance, “ it 
possesses a gravitational pull, a magnetic existence that creates real effects—at 
tis best, social relationships of mutual care and responsibility”  (p. 221). 
Teleologically, community can be seen as “ the continually reproduced desire 
to overcome the adversity of social life”  (p. 221). 
 
While such a definition is useful and understandable within a 
postmodern theoretical framework, it is not useful enough, I would argue for 
practitioners who need to work with “ community” .  While acknowledging 
the polyvocal social constructedness of community, such practitioners still 
need a definition of community that assumes tangibility in order to interact 
with it physically and communicatively.  
A tangible community, then, can be described in the following way. 
 
1. Communities may share a common geographical space, but 
quite often do not. 
2. Groups of people become communities when they identify with 
a common set of characteristics or cause, even though there may 
be considerable elements of diversity such as age, sex, 
geography, social roles and the like. 
3. These elements of diversity provide the continual grounds for 
the fragmentation of community. 
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4. People who speak for communities do so, aware or unaware, 
that they do not have unanimous support or that they have 
occluded certain members.  
5. While diverse in composition, community members can be 
considered as such when they identify with a significant 
defining characteristic of that community membership. 
6. The vitality of communities is dependent on the characteristics 
of open systems (Monge, 1977; von Bertalanffy, 1968).4  
7. However, the integrity of communities maintained as originally 
conceived (i.e., traditional, fundamentalist), depend on the 
enforcement of foundational principles. A lthough such 
communities face the likelihood of atrophy, their viability 
depends on continually attracting fervent adherents. 
8. Community cannot be enforced, but must emerge from the 
desire to belong. 
9. Community members will remain as community members, 
despite adversity, so long as they sufficiently believe in its 
principles of membership or have a significant element of their 
identity incorporated in community membership.  
 
4. POLITICAL EXPRESSIONS  
 
Traditional notions of community have been incorporated into 
conservative ideological discourses with backward looking orientations 
(Morris, 1996), even by neo-liberal governments with strongly individualist 
philosophies, such as the Howard Government. Crucial to this political 
appropriation of “ community”  by political parties is an ideologically charged 
value system. According to Anthony Giddens in The Third Way. The Renewal of 
Social Democracy (1998, quoted in Fremeaux, 2005, p. 268), community  
doesn’t simply imply trying to capture lost forms of social solidarity; 
it refers to practical means of furthering the social and material 
refurbishment of neighbourhoods, towns and larger local areas. 
We see in this assertion an attempt to regain some valuable characteristic that 
has been lost where the term “ solidarity”  discursively taps into a rich 
labourist vein of working class ethics. This lexical signifier carries traces of 
(mostly masculine) class identity and loyalty, stoicism in adversity, and 
egalitarianism that is clearly at odds with the neo-liberal subject within a neo-
classical economic structure that the Blair Government had consolidated from 
the Thatcher-Major era. However, when one looks more closely at the 
government policies emanating from such communitarian appeals, they are 
often quite individualist (Fairclough, 2000; Hall, 1998).  
 
The political discourses of the major political parties in US, UK, and 
Australia are now dominated by concepts of personal responsibility, 
reciprocity, and community. They are manifested in reduced government 
services, lower taxes, privatisation, work-for-the-dole, and private 
superannuation. In Australia, the Howard Government justifies work-for-the 
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dole schemes on the basis of mutual obligations (Yeend, 2004) arising between 
unemployed people and the taxpaying public. The government has also 
attempted to link social capital to solving regional problems largely induced 
by globalisation and neo-liberalism. 
 
In this new political scenario, the community’s social capital replaces the 
government in providing assistance to those in need. The Third Way links the 
personal and political in a way that no longer understands citizens as social 
citizens with varying levels of dependency on the state, which was the case 
for most of the twentieth century. Citizens are considered at root to be ethical 
creatures, according to Rose (2000). A lthough desiring personal autonomy as 
a right, citizens are less and less considered as national collectivities as 
“ communities”   — neighbourhoods, associations, networks, lifestyles etc 
(Rose, 2000, p. 1398). The new form of ethopolitics that governs such 
communities is based on “ ethical self-regulation of the individual in terms of 
fixed moral codes, and the self-crafting of one’s existence according to a 
certain art of living (p. 1399). Given this new conception of the citizen, 
community “ consists of multiple objectifications formed at the unstable and 
uncomfortable intersections between politics and that which should and must 
remain beyond its reach”  (p. 1401). Drawing on Etzioni, Rose construes 
community as “ an affective and ethical field, binding its elements into durable 
relations” . Thus, with individualised and internalised ethics, not so much 
directed by external authorities such as church or state as by personal choices 
of lifestyle, consumption and subjectivity (Featherstone 1991), “ it is possible 
for subjects to distance themselves from the cohesive strategies of the social 
state ... and access resources of subject formation in order to invent 
themselves, individually and collectively, as new kinds of political actors”  (p. 
1402). Appropriated for Third Way politics, then, a community in a civil 
society “ is a veritably bucolic zone of liberty, ‘a place where citizens freely act 
together to consolidate and express their freedoms, to solve problems, to 
provide services to each other or to simply enjoy each other’s company’”  (p. 
1405). 
 
Communitarian politics, then, clearly, faces a huge political challenge. 
Contemporary communitarianism, says Brent (2004), fails to account for the 
structural forces of globalist capitalism which creates uncertainty, “ sweeps 
away local structures” , valorizes individualization (see also Friedland, 2001), 
and strengthens race, gender, and class divisions (p. 215). Essentially, 
communitarian based politics needs to take account of the postmodern subject 
and acknowledge the vastly changed socio-economic circumstances. Civil 
society in which communities exist is a “ strange multiplicity” , a “ complex 
terrain”  of diverse struggles for cultural recognition that often cut across one 
another and across the territorial boundaries of the nation state (Wenman, 
2003, p. 168). These struggles constitute agonistic pluralism comprising 
necessary interdependence and strife (p. 168). Politics in these circumstances 
is based on a community  that is hegemonically constructed, according to 
Mouffe, and so is a “ community without a definite shape and in continuous 
re-enactment”  (quoted in Wenman, 2003, p. 182). 
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5. POSSIBILITIES 
 
Postmodern theorists such as Burkett  do not let the issue of community lapse 
into the sort of postmodern relativism that negates concerted political action 
or even structure. Rather, she sees the building of community as “ an ongoing 
act of extraordinary creativity in which one comes face to face with the 
struggle of  human relationship, of engaging with an-Other”  (p. 237). 
Similarly positive is O’Hara (1996) who claims that by seeing community as 
an ongoing creation the “ we co-create reality which in turn creates us,”  
thereby creating a new kind of community (p. 151).  
 
To survive within the current conditions of globalised neo-liberal 
capitalist hegemony will require  “ complex and dynamic”  features (Brent, 
2004). As well the notion of place will need to be withdrawn from the defining 
characteristic of community. While it is true that many /  most communities 
form around a geographical location, many do not, or only meet infrequently 
in a “ place” . This is so for two reasons. Community built primarily on place 
can be restrictive and exclusionary, to the point of xenophobia and 
supremacism (e.g., The World War 2 Axis allies of Japan and Germany). 
 
Like Friedland (2001), I am dubious whether the concept of community 
is sufficiently useful in a post-industrial society as it can be marshalled and 
appropriated in various polysemic forms to suit various political objectives 
that advantage one sector of society over another. However, I share his belief 
that we need to sustain and nurture a particular democratic and egalitarian 
form of community not just for participatory democracy to function, but to 
enhance our humanity. A lthough rejecting Habermas’s idealised notion of 
communicative action (Habermas, 1984, 1987, 1989), it is true that “ all 
communities lie … at the seam of system and lifeworld” .  By testing our 
notions of community and the boundary that it shares with corporations, we 
may come to a richer understanding of whether capitalist organisations can 
contribute to healthy communities. 
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